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FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT-DUE PROCESS FOR PRISONERS IN
COMMITMENT PROCEEDINGS

Vitek v. Jones, 100 S. Ct. 1254 (1980).
INTRODUCTION

Last term the Supreme Court considered
whether the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment entitles a convicted prisoner to procedural safeguards, including notice, an adversary
hearing, and appointed counsel, before he is involuntarily transferred to a state mental hospital.' In
Vitek v.Jones,2 the Court held that the fourteenth
amendment grants these protections to prison inmates, except that the state is required to provide
only "qualified and independent assistance" 3 and
not legal counsel at the prisoner's hearing. The
Court reasoned that characterizing prisoners as
mentally ill and transferring them to mental hospitals had stigmatizing consequences which, together with the mandatory psychiatric treatment
and greater physical restraints, constituted a major
change in their conditions of confinement. Since
the Court found that this change of conditions
amounted to a grievous loss to the prisoner, it
should not be imposed without the opportunity for
notice and a fair hearing.
Vitek is important for two reasons. First, the
Court held that prisoners have liberty interests
independent of state law or specific constitutional
guarantees. In so doing, the Court may have signaled a shift in procedural due process methodology in prisoners' rights cases. Rather than finding
that state law is the exclusive source of prisoners'
rights, as it had in earlier cases, the Court found
that the deprivation of liberty following a determination of guilt is partial. Because liberty and
custody are not mutually exclusive, a residuum of
constitutionally protected liberties remains even
after a determination of guilt.4 Thus the fourteenth
amendment secures to prisoners many liberty interests which are among the natural rights that the
Constitution was intended to protect. Hence, any
interference with those liberties inflicting a grievous
I U.S. CONsr. amend. XIV states, in pertinent part:
"nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law."
2 100 S. Ct. 1254 (1980).
3id. at 1267.
4Id. at 1264. See Note, ProceduralDue Process-Prisoners'
Rights, 57 B.U. L. REv. 387, 392 (1977).

loss on the individual must meet fourteenth amendment standards. The Court distinguished Meachum
v. Fano5 and Montanye v. Haymes,6 which had concluded that a predicate for invoking due process
protections is the existence of some positive law.7
Second, the Court found that a prisoner has a
strong liberty interest in not being transferred from
prison to a mental hospital. The Court found that
such a transfer is distinguishable from involuntary
transfer from one prison to another! The Court
again distinguished Meachum and Montanye, which
had approved transfers within the correctional system without hearings undertaken for administrative or rehabilitative reasons. The Vitek Court
found that the transfer from prison to a mental
hospital is not merely administrative, given the
stigma that attaches to the mentally ill, as well as
the involuntary medication and psychiatric treatment. Therefore, the Court reasoned that the requirement of a formal hearing before an involuntary transfer to a state mental hospital would not
involve the judiciary in discretionary decisions of
state prison officials that9 the Court is institutionally
incompetent to resolve.
FACTS AND HISTORY

Joseph Jones was convicted of robbery in Nebraska and sentenced to prison for a term of years.
He began serving his sentence with the Department
of Corrections but was involuntarily transferred to
a state mental hospital, which is not within the
Department of Corrections but is within the Department of Public Institutions.
The Nebraska Director of Correctional Services
is authorized by section 83-716 of the Nebraska
Revised Statutes to designate any available, suitable, and appropriate residence facility or institution as a place of confinement, and to transfer a
prisoner from one place of confinement to another.' 0 Jones, however, was transferred from
'427 U.S. 215 (1976).

0 427 U.S. 236 (1976).
1427 U.S. at 227.
8 100 S. Ct. at 1264.
9

1d.

§ 83-176 (1943) declares that whenever any person is sentenced or committed under any
10 NEB. REv. STAT.
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prison to a mental hospital pursuant to section 83180(1), which provides that if a physician or psychologist designated by the Director finds that a
prisoner "suffers from a mental disease or defect"
and that he "cannot be given adequate treatment"
in prison, the Director may transfer the inmate to
a mental hospital." Under section 83-180(3), any
prisoner transferred to a mental hospital is to be
returned to the Department prior to the expiration
of his sentence if treatment is no longer necessary.
Section 83-180(3) also provides that upon expiration of the sentence, if the State wants to retain the
prisoner in a mental hospital, civil commitment
procedures must begin promptly.12 Jones was transferred without any formal notice or hearing, nor
any procedural safeguard except the determination
provision of law to a specific facility within the Department of Correctional Services, "he shall be deemed to be
sentenced or committed to the department." The Director of Correctional Services, according to the statute, is
authorized to designate as the place of confinement of
any person committed to the department "any available,
suitable and appropriate residence facility or institution,
whether or not operated by the state, and may at any
time transfer such person from one place of confinement
to another," with some declared restrictions as to minors.
" NFB. REv. STAT. § 83-180(1) (1943) provides:
When a physician designated by the Director of
Correctional Services finds that a person committed
to the department suffers from a physical disease or
defect, or when a physician or psychologist designated by the director finds that a person committed
to the department suffers from a mental disease or
defect, the chief executive officer may order such a
person to be segregated from other persons in the
facility. If the physician or psychologist is of the
opinion that the person cannot be given adequate
treatment in that facility, the director may arrange
for his transfer for examination, study, and treatment to any medical-correctional facility, or to another institution in the Department of Public Institutions where proper treatment is available. A person who is so transferred shall remain subject to the
jurisdiction and custody of the Department of Correctional Services and shall be returned to the department when, prior to the expiration of his sentence, treatment in such facility is no longer necessary.
12 NEB. REV. STAT. § 83-180(3) (1943) provides:
When two psychiatrists designated by the Director
of Correctional Services finds that a person about
to be released or discharged from any facility suffers
from a mental disease or defect of such a nature
that his release or discharge will endanger the public
safety or the safety of the offender, the director shall
transfer him to, or if he has already been transferred
permit him to remain in, a psychiatric facility in the
Department of Public Institutions and shall
promptly commence proceedings applicable to the
civil commitment and detention of persons suffering
from such disease or defect.
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of the Director that he suffered from a mental
disease and could not be given proper treatment in
the prison.
Jones brought an action challenging the constitutionality of section 83-180(1) on procedural due
process grounds. The United States District Court
for the District of Nebraska held that the transfer
procedure had indeed deprived him of liberty without due process of law contrary to the fourteenth
amendment. 13 The court held that due process
required that the transfer to a mental hospital be
accompanied by adequate formal notice, an adversary hearing before an independent decision maker,
a written statement of the evidence relied upon
and the reasons for the decision, and the appointment 4of counsel for Jones, since he was an indigent.1
The lower court offered two distinct grounds for
its holding. First, it identified a liberty interest
rooted in section 83-180(1), under which Jones
could reasonably expect that he would not be
transferred to a mental hospital unless he were
mentally ill and could not receive adequate treatment in prison.' 5 Second, the court stated that,
regardless of the statute, the transfer of Jones from
prison to a mental hospital must be accompanied
by appropriate safeguards. The court reasoned that
transferring Jones to a mental hospital had some
stigmatizing consequences, which, together with
the mandatory medication, psychiatric treatment,
and greater physical restraints to which he would
be subject at the hospital, constituted a major
change in his conditions of confinement. Since this
change in conditions amounted to a grievous loss
to Jones, it could not be imposed without notice
and a fair hearing.' 6 Because Jones had been transferred back to the psychiatric ward of the prison,
the district court permanently enjoined Nebraska
from again transferring Jones to a mental
hospital
17
without the prescribed procedures.
The United States Supreme Court vacated the
judgment of the district court and remanded the s
case for consideration of whether it was moot.
The Court's reason for the decision was that Jones
had been paroled on the condition that he accept
medical treatment after the district court had
granted the injunction. However, Jones subsequently violated his parole and was returned to
jail. Relying upon Jones' history of mental illness
13Miller v. Vitek, 437 F. Supp. 569 (D. Neb. 1977).
14 Id. at 574-75.
15Id. at 572-73.
16id.
17 Id. at 575.
13Vitek v. Jones, 436 U.S. 407 (1978).

1980]

PRISONERS IN COMMITMENT PROCEEDINGS

and Nebraska's representation that he was cuirrently a serious threat to his own and others' safety,
the district court held that the parole and revocation did not render the case moot because Jones
could still be transferred if the injunction were
removed. 19 The district court reinstated its judgment, and Nebraska appealed. °
THE SUPREME COURT OPINION
Writing for a majority of five, 21 justice White
first held that the case was not moot. White reasoned that the controversy between Jones and Nebraska had not been rendered moot by the revocation of Jones' parole and his return to prison.
Since Jones was protected from a future transfer to
the state mental hospital only by the injunction of
the district court, White concluded that it was not
absolutely certain that Jones would never be transferred again. 22 Since finding that the case was moot
would not only vacate the injunction against Jones'
transfer, but also the declaration that Nebraska's
transfer procedures were inadequate, White found
that the case presented a real controversy.2
19Vitek v. Jones, 100 S. Ct. at 1260.
20 id.
21Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens concurred
in the judgment. Justice Powell also concurred in the
judgment except that he did not believe that Nebraska
was obligated to provide Jones with legal counsel as long
as it otherwise provided him with "qualified and independent" assistance.
" 100 S. Ct. at 1260. BecauseJones had not completed
serving his sentence, he was subject to the transfer procedures he challenged, unlike the plaintiff in Weinstein
v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147 (1975), where a challenge to
the parole procedures was held to be moot because the
plaintiff had completed his sentence and there was no
longer any likelihood whatsoever that he would again be
subject to the parole procedures challenged.
23 Id. at 1260. See also County of Los Angeles v. Davis,
440 U.S. 625, 631 (1979); United States v. Phosphate
Export Ass'n, 393 U.S. 199, 203 (1968); United States v.
W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 633 (1953). In each of
these cases, the Court adopted the standard that a case
is not moot unless it is clear that the controverted wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur if
there were no injunction. The Court has emphasized that
the standard is strict in formulation and practice. If
voluntary cessation of wrongful behavior was sufficient
to moot the case, the Court would have no alternative
other than to let the defendant repeat his previous behavior. However, that the Court has stressed a powerful
public interest in having the legality of a disputed practice resolved militates against a determination that the
case is moot. As the Court has noted, if a case is moot,
the defendant is entitled to dismissal as a matter of right.
Vilek demonstrates that courts are often unwilling to give
defendants this opportunity to stave off effective enforcement of public laws.

Turning to the merits, justice White then considered the threshold question of whether the involuntary transfer of Jones implicated a liberty
interest protected by the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment. First, White agreed with
the district court that section 83-180(1) creates an
"objective expectation firmly rooted in state law
and penal complex practice" that a prisoner would
not be transferred "unless he suffered a mental
disease or defect that could not be adequately
treated in the prison.' ' 4 justice White found that
this objective expectation gave Jones a liberty interest that entitled him to the safeguards of appropriate procedures to determine whether the transfer
was justified. He noted that the Court has often
held that state statutes create liberty interests
which merit procedural protection under the fourteenth amendment. Once the state has granted an
inmate a liberty interest, procedural protections
are necessary "to insure that the state created right
is not arbitrarily abrogated. ' '
Second, and more important, justice White
agreed with the district court's holding that independently of the statute, a convicted criminal retains a residuum of liberty that would be infringed
by a transfer to a mental hospital without minimum procedural safeguards. He reasoned that the
consequences of transfer to a mental hospital are
qualitatively different from criminal punishment,
and therefore Jones could not be transferred without being afforded appropriate procedural safeguards.2 6 The stigma attached to psychiatric treatment accounts for the qualitative difference between the two forms of confinement. Justice White
noted that involuntary commitment produces adverse social and economic consequences for the
individual that endure for the rest of his life.
Furthermore, among the liberties protected by the
due process clause is the "right to be free from, and
to obtain judicial relief for, unjustified intrusions
on personal security.' 2 7 Therefore, compelled treatment in the form of behavior modification, which
Jones received, was weighted heavily by the district
court in determining whether the conditions of
Jones' confinement were within the sentence imposed upon him.
justice White thought that the district court had
properly identified the elements of the minimum
v. Jones, 100 S.Ct. at 1262.
at 1261 (quoting Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S.
539,6 557 (1974)).
2 Id.at 1264.
2id. at 1263 (quoting Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S.
651, 673 (1977)).
2Vitek
2Id.
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procedure that must be followed before transferring a prisoner to a mental hospital. While conceding that the decision to transfer a prisoner to a
mental hospital was essentially medical, Justice
White found that the medical nature of the decision did not justify dispensing with a due process
2
requirement. s Instead, he held that "the subtleties
and nuances of psychiatric diagnoses"2 justify the
30
requirement of adversary hearings. Although the
majority of the Court supported the conclusion
that due process required notice and an adversary
hearing, only fourJustices voted forJustice White's
conclusion that Nebraska must provide Jones with
legal counsel in the formal hearing. Recognizing
that the Court has not required the automatic
appointment of counsel for indigent prisoners facing other deprivations of liberty, Justice White
nevertheless contended that a prisoner suffering
from a mental disease or defect had a greater need
for assistance because he would be more likely "to
3
be unable to understand or exercise his rights." '
Because Justice Powell would not have required
the state to furnish a licensed attorney, the Court
modified the district court decision to conform with
Powell's concurrence.
Justice Powell joined the opinion of the Court
except to the extent that it required that an attorney be provided. He noted that the issue in a
commitment transfer proceeding is essentially medical, and that the Court would allow a nonlawyer
to act as the impartial decisionmaker in the transfer
proceeding. Justice Powell concluded that "the
fairness of an informal hearing to determine a
medical issue does not require the participation of
lawyers,, 3 2 because the resolution of factual disputes is less important than the evaluation of expert
psychiatric testimony. Therefore, a mental health
professional might well be preferred to a lawyer to
render assistance in a transfer hearing. Since facts
in such a hearing must be interpreted by psychologists and psychiatrists, Justice Powell would preserve the possibility that competent laymen may
represent prisoners in some cases.
Justice Stewart, whose opinion Chief Justice
sld. at 1265.
2

Id. (quoting Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 430

(1979)).
' Id. The Addington Court noted that psychiatric diagnoses are primarily based upon medical impressions
that are heavily subjective. When these subjective impressions are filtered through the experience of the physician,
he is seldom able to offer any definite conclusions about
particular mental patients.
., Id. at 1266.
32Id. at 1267.
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Burger and Justice Rehnquist joined, dissented on
the ground that the case was moot.33 Since Jones
was incarcerated at the time the case reached the
Court, Justice Stewart contended that he had no
more standing than any other Nebraska prisoner
to challenge the constitutionality of the statute.
The mere possibility that the statute might be
invoked to transfer Jones to another institution did
not give him standing. Justice Stewart reasoned
that although Jones was once transferred in accordance with the statute, no demonstrated probability existed that it would ever happen again.3
Furthermore, the case did not fall within the ambit
of the "capable of repetition yet evading review"
35
exception to the standard of mootness Justice
Stewart concluded that if Jones should again be
threatened with transfer under the statute, there
would be time to reach the merits of his claim. In
the meantime, the36Court should not adjudicate a
nonexistent cause.
Justice Blackmun wrote a separate dissent in
3 7
which he argued that the issue was not yet ripe.
Justice Blackmun thought that the asserted injury
3 Id. at 1267. Justices Stewart, Rehnquist, Blackmun,
and Chief Justice Burger did not reach the constitutional
and administrative law issues in the case. Therefore,
while their decisions have been summarized, they have
not been analyzed.
34 Id. at 1268 (citing Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S.
at 147).
' See Super Tire Engineering Co. v. McCorkle, 411
U.S. 115 (1973); Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. I.C.C.,
219 U.S. 498 (1910). This exception to established standards of mootness has been applied when there is nothing
that a judgment of the Court could have affected if the
suit had been entertained. The Court has stated that it
uses this exception so that its judgments cannot be
avoided by the short term and manipulative orders of
government agencies, which are capable of repetition but
also of evading review of the Court. The exception is
inapplicable to the present case because Jones was protected from future transfers without a hearing only by
the outstanding injunction of the district court. The
Court commented that the current status of Jones was
not the product of Nebraska's voluntary discontinuance
of their plan to transfer Jones. The Court reasoned that
even the decision to award and revoke parole was made
by the Nebraska parole board, not by the state prison
officials.
3
6 Vitek v. Jones, 100 S. Ct. at 1268.
,7 Id. at 1269. Justice Blackmun noted that the Court
has laid down a flexible standard to determine whether
a dispute is ripe for adjudication. See O'Shea v. Littleton,
414 U.S. 488, 495 (1974) ("past exposure to illegal conduct does not in itself show a present case or controversy"
and therefore "general assertions or inferences" that an
individual will engage in illegal conduct do not render a
case ripe); Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488
(1923) (requiring that the litigant "has sustained or is
immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury").
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to Jones disappeared at the latest when he was
granted parole, as did any immediate threat that
the injury would recur. HoweverJustice Blackmun
conceded that since Jones had been returned to
prison his reincarceration and history of mental
problems had brought the controversy back to life.
Nevertheless, he did not believe that the facts
indicated a ripe case, noting that since the remand
state officials had indicated nothing more than
that they retained a general right to apply their
statute to Jones if necessary. They did not have a
present desire to transfer Jones pursuant to statute
if the injunction were lifted. Justice Blackmun
concluded that the case was not ripe, because to
determine whether prison officials will seek to
transferJones again would take the Court into "the
realm of speculation and conjecture."8
ANALYsIs

Due process is triggered when the state seeks to
deprive an individual of a constitutionally protected liberty interest.39 Due process requires that
the individual be given notice and the opportunity
to be heard. These requirements protect the individual from an arbitrary infringement of his rights
by the state.4
The determination whether an individual is entitled to due process consists of two questions. First,
the court must decide whether the asserted interest
falls within the concepts of "life, liberty, and prop41
erty" of the due process clause. Second, if a
constitutionally protected interest is affected, the
2
court must then determine what process is due.
3Justice Blackmun found it irrelevant that the Nebraska prison officials had announced their intention to
continue to use the challenged procedures. He argued
that it is not surprising that state officials say that they
will abide by the state's own laws. See United Public
Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 91 (1947) ("the existence of the law and the regulations does not render the
suit ripe'). However, Justice Blackmun did not want to
go as far as Justice Stewart when Stewart said that Jones
was "simply one of thousands of Nebraska's prisoners."
100 S. Ct. at 1267. He noted that for purposes of the case
or controversy requirement,Jones differed from his fellow
inmates in two respects. First, he had a recent history of
psychiatric problems. Second, he had been previously
transferred under the statute. However, for the other
reasons stated, Justice Blackmun was unwilling to admit
that this was enough to satisfy the case or controversy
requirement.
"Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath,
341 U.S. 123, 168 (1951).
4
0 See generally Michelman, The Supreme Court and Litigation Access Fees: The Right to Protect One's Rights-PartII,

1974 DUKE L.J. 524, 537.
41 Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
42 Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972).

The extent of the procedural safeguards due the
individual depends upon the extent to which he
will suffer a grievous loss.' a Thus, the court decides
what process is due by balancing the individual's
interest in avoiding the detriment against the
state's interest in summary infliction of that detriment. 44
During the last decade, the Court has wavered
about the source of a prisoner's liberty interest
under the fourteenth amendment. At the same
time that it has attempted to provide prison officials with guiding principles about the requirements of the fourteenth amendment, it has also
pursued other important goals. These include limiting the judiciary's interference with administrative decisions, and restraining the logical possibilities of the broad language of the due process clause.
Early prisoners' rights cases such as Haines v. Ker-

47
46
ner,4s Morrissey v. Brewer, Gagnon v. Scarpelli, Wolff
9
4s
extended
v.
Palmigiano"
v. McDonnell, and Baxter

procedural due process safeguards to inmates by
indicating that state law is not the exclusive source
of prisoners' liberty interests. Then, in Meachum v.
5
5°
Fano, Montanye v. Haymes, ' and Greenholtz v. Ne2
braska Penal Inmates,5 an erosion of due process

protections appeared in the Court's determination
that the existence of a state law conferring a right
upon an inmate was a predicate for invoking due
process. Finally, in Vitek, the Court appears to have
returned to its original position that the word
"liberty" in the fourteenth amendment guarantees
inmates' rights independently of positive law.
In the first due process case involving prisoners'
rights, Haines v. Kerner, an inmate was transferred
to solitary confinement without a hearing. Both
the district court and the court of appeals held that
in the absence of state statutes specifying transfer
procedures the prisoner did not have the right to
due process safeguardsas The courts reasoned that
the conviction extinguishes the prisoner's liberty,
and consequently prison officials have wide discretion in discipline." The Supreme Court reversed,
43

Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath,

341 U.S. at 168.
4See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262-63 (1970);

Note, supra note 4, at 390.
4- 404 U.S. 519 (1972) (per curiam).
46408 U.S. 471 (1972).
47 411 U.S. 778 (1973).
48 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
49425 U.S. 308 (1976).

427 U.S. 215.
5'427 U.S. 236.
52 442 U.S. 1 (1979).
5 404 U.S. at 520.
5
50

4Id.
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arguing that the state may not arbitrarily abrogate
a prisoner's rights concerning the conditions of his
confinement. The Court implied that a prisoner
has liberty interests even though there is no state
statute which would give him an expectation of
due process. 55
In Morrissey v. Brewer, the Court held that the
state must give a prisoner a hearing before it
revokes his parole. The Morrissey Court found an
implicit promise in the state parole statute that an
individual will not have his parole revoked in the
absence of a violation of its provisions, regardless
of the state courts' interpretation that the parole
statute committed all parole-related issues to the
discretion of the board.as The Court adopted the
same standard for determining the procedural protections of prisoners that it adopted for procedural
rights of other citizens in Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee
Committee v. McGrath:5 7 whether procedural protections are due any person depends upon the extent
to which he will be required to suffer a grievous
loss. Morrissey rejected the concept that a prisoner's
constitutional rights depend upon whether a state
benefit can be characterized as a right under state
law.s8 Consequently, an inmate retains a degree of
liberty with which the state cannot arbitrarily interfere. A prisoner can be deprived of his liberty
only following a valid conviction and only to a
limited extent. The Court, however, commented
that an individual whose parole has been revoked
has been deprived merely of a conditional liberty
rather than the absolute freedom enjoyed prior to
conviction. As a result, the procedural protections
due the parolee are not as stringent as those the
state must afford him at trial. 59 The procedures
that the state must use to deprive the parolee of his
liberty interest are flexible. Morrissey emphasized
that the revocation of parole triggered a constitutionally protected liberty interest that did not depend on state law.
In Gagnon v. Scarpelli, the Court held that revocation of probation where a sentence has been
previously imposed is constitutionally indistinguishable from revocation of parole. Therefore, due
process must also be observed when the state revokes the conditional freedom afforded by probation. As in Morrissey, the Court did not predicate

55Id.
408 U.S. at 482.
sT341 U.S. at 168.
s 408 U.S. at 480 (citing Graham v. Richardson, 403
U.S. 365, 374 (1971)).
59408 U.S. at 484.
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due process upon the expectations flowing from the
state probation statute, but instead examined the
detriment suffered by a prisoner deprived of probation. 60 Finding that the loss of liberty caused by
61
revocation of probation is a serious deprivation
requiring that a prisoner be accorded due process,
the Court held that the probationer had suffered
a grievous loss.
Some commentators thought that Morrissey left
the question undecided whether a convict who
remains in custody is entitled to procedural safeguards.6 2 In Wolff v. McDonnell, the Court held that
an inmate is entitled to due process protections to
the same extent as a prisoner who has been granted
the conditional liberty of parole. Thus incarceration is constitutionally irrelevant in determining a
convicted criminal's rights under the due process
clause. Furthermore, the Court held that when a
prisoner is given the opportunity to obtain a
shortened jail sentence by the accumulation of
good-time credits, the revocation of credits is valid
only if the state accords the prisoner procedural
due process.63 Although credits are staiutory entitlements, the Court held that there was no constitutional difference between the procedures that are
required for liberty interests protected by state
statute and those protected by the due process
clause. 64 The Court concluded that procedural
safeguards are necessary whenever "a major change
in the conditions of confinement" is imposed as a
punishment for misconduct.6 The Court stated:
Lawful imprisonment necessarily makes unavailable
many of the rights and privileges of the ordinary
citizen .... But though his rights may be diminished
by the needs and exigencies of the institutional
environment, a prisoner is not wholly stripped of
60411 U.S. at 782 (1973).
61 id.

62 Note, supra note 4, at 392; The Supreme Court, 1972
Term, 86 HARV. L. REv. 50, 101-02 (1972).
634 18 U.S. at 558.

' 418 U.S. at 571-72 n. 19. The Court applied the same
standard to determine when a prisoner has a liberty
interest under the fourteenth amendment that it uses in
cases of civilians: the court must determine whether an
individual will be condemned to suffer a grievous loss.
Then, the Court found that it must balance the governmental interest involved and the importance of the private interest that has been affected by state action.
Consequently, the Court found no difference between the
procedures that must be followed for revocation of goodtime credits and those procedures that are mandated
when solitary confinement, which is not regulated by
state law, is to be imposed.
mid_ at 571-72 n-19-
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constitutional protections when he is imprisoned for
a crime. There is no iron curtain drawn between
the
66
Constitution and the prisoners of this country.
In Baxter v. Palmigiano, the Court reiterated that

additional procedural protections are due whenever a major change in the conditions of prison life
amounts to a substantial detriment to the inmate.
Again, the Court refused to limit due process to
rights guaranteed expressly by state statute. Although the Court, citing Wolff, did not extend
supplementary procedural protections to a prisoner
being given a disciplinary hearing, it did not limit
procedural privileges in prisoners' rights cases. 67
The Court simply found that the institutional interests of the prison in avoiding the additional cost
and inconvenience of supplementary procedures
outweighed the inmate's need for more procedural
protections. 68 The Court recognized that the convicted prisoner possesses many liberty interests protected by the due process clause. However, the
procedural protections granted to the inmate were
constitutionally adequate.
These decisions, moreover, suggest that prison
procedures are given legitimacy in the eyes of the
prisoners and society as a whole if they comport
with the requirements of due process. The prisoner
who is afforded an opportunity to be heard has the
satisfaction of participating in the decision and
knowing the reasons for the result.69 The legitimacy
of decisions affecting prisoners' rights is enhanced
by public awareness that prison procedures adhere
to societal notions of fundamental fairness. Thus,
the requirements of due process in prisoners' rights
decisions not only ensure that the state will not act
arbitrarily, but also give these decisions70 moral and
legal sanction outside the prison walls.

66lId

at 555-56.

67 425 U.S. at 324. The Court explicitly stated that it

was not "retreating" from the position it carved out in
Wolff concerning prisoners' rights to procedural safeguards.
68Id.

'See Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. Mc-

Grath, 341 U.S. at 171-72 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).

After laying the groundwork for the modern law
of prisoners' rights, the Court decided Meachum v.
Fano, Montanye v. Haymes, and Greenholtz v. Nebraska

Penal Inmates. The positivist concept of prisoners'
rights espoused in these cases ultimately proved
inadequate to protect constitutional liberty. In
Meachum v. Fano, for instance, prison officials transferred a prisoner from a medium security institution for disciplinary reasons after a minimal hearing. The Court concluded that prison officials may
transfer an inmate to a more restrictive prison
without infringing a protected liberty interest even
if the prisoner's life is more disagreeable as a result.
The Court based its conclusion on the finding that
state law did not condition prison transfers on the
occurrence of a specified event. 7 1 The Court rejected the contention that any major loss inflicted
upon the individual prisoner mandates additional
procedural safeguards. Moreover, supplementary
procedures are not necessary merely because a
change 72in prison conditions adversely affects an
inmate.

Meachum adopted an entitlement theory which
holds that state law is the sole source of a prisoner's
liberty interests. The Court emphasized that the
existence of a state statute which gives an inmate
an objective expectation of a liberty interest is 7a3
"predicate" for invoking due process protections.
The Court reasoned that the due process clause
assures a prisoner no procedural protections unless
the government affirmatively indicates that it will
honor a particular liberty interest. However, the
theory that expectations induced by government
do not constitute interests protected by due process
unless they are grounded in positive law is founded
on the same notion as the discredited rights-privileges doctrine. This theory, in effect, states that
where a state may refuse to grant a benefit at all,
necessarily that benefit may be granted on any
terms the state chooses. This proposition, as Justice
Stevens stated in his dissent in Meachum, "demeans
the concept of liberty itself." 74 Justice Stevens
stressed that liberty exists apart from law, which
merely serves to place restrictions on the state's

Said Justice Frankfurter:

The validity and moral authority of a conclusion

Perhaps no characteristic of an organized society is

largely depend upon the mode by which it was

more fundamental than its erection and enforcement of a system of rules defining the various rights
and duties of its members, enabling them to govern
their affairs and definitively settle their differences
in an orderly, predictable manner.

reached.... No better instrument has been devised
for arriving at truth than to give a person in jeopardy of serious loss notice of the case against him an
opportunity to meet it. Nor has a better way been
found for generating the feeling, so important to a
popular government, that justice has been done.
"See, e.g., Boddie v. Connecticut, 407 U.S. 371, 374

(1971):

7'427 U.S. at 226-28; see Note, supra note 4, at 394.
72Id. at 224.
73

Id. at 227.

74427 U.S. at 233.
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ability to interfere with liberty. 75 The entitlement
doctrine contradicts the political philosophy underlying the United States Constitution. John
Locke viewed all men as naturally in "a state of
perfect freedom to order their actions, and dispose
of their possessions and persons, as they think fit,
within the bounds of nature, without asking leave
76
or depending upon the will of any other man."
The authors of the Federalist Papers did not find it
necessary to adopt a Bill of Rights for as the people
"retain everything, they have no need for particular reservations." 7 Therefore, the Meachum Court's
contention that liberty is defined by specific constitutional provisions or state law conflicts with the
understanding that the people retain all rights and
privileges not expressly delegated to their government.
The Meachum Court's reinterpretation of Morrissey and Wolff is illustrative of the Court's positivist
focus. Without an examination of the informal
understandings between the prison and the inmate
about the conditions of confinement, the Court
characterized the inmate's expectation that he
could remain in a more favorable prison as "too
ephemeral."7 8 However, the Morrissey Court found
an "implicit promise" that an individual would
not have his parole revoked in violation of its terms.
The Meachum Court also ignored the Court's earlier
statement in Wolff that any substantial, negative
change in the conditions of confinement necessitates a formal hearing.7 9 The Court ignored a
strong dictum in Wolffthat a prisoner has a liberty
interest in being free from deprivations which are
not conditioned upon violation of statutory provisions, such as solitary confinement.80 Instead, the
Court argued that Wolff should be read narrowly
because the liberty interest protected in Wolff did
not spring from the Constitution but was grounded
in state law. The Court compared the statute in
Wolff, which authorized the revocation of credits
only when an inmate misbehaves, to the statute in
Meachum, which did not grant the prisoner the right
to remain in the prison where he was initially
confined. 8 ' On the basis of this comparison, the
7

5Id.

at 230.

76J. LOCKE, An Essay Concerning the True Original,Extent
& End of Civil Government (1690) in SOCIAL CONTRACT 1, 4

(1948).

84 (A. Hamilton) in
ERALIST 575, 578 (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
78 427 U.S. at 227.
77THE FEDERALIST No.

79408 U.S. at 482.
80427 U.S. at 226.
81Id.
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Court determined that, because the statute at issue
in Meachum assigned the determination of whether
an inmate should be transferred to the judgment
of the prison administration, the reason for
2 invoking due process in Wolffdid not pertain.8
In a companion case, Montanye v. Haymes, the

Court faced the question whether an inmate may
be transferred between maximum security institutions on the ground that he had circulated an
unauthorized petition of grievances. Following the
approach set down in Meachum, the Court held that
no liberty interest of a convicted inmate is infringed
when he is transferred from one prison to another
within the state.83 The Court reasoned that as long
as the prisoner's conditions are within the sentence
imposed upon him and not otherwise violative of
specific provisions of the Constitution, due process
is not triggered. 84 As in Meachum, the Court refused
to look beyond positive law to the informal understandings between an inmate and the state to see
if a substantial interest of the prisoner has been
infringed.
The last case decided before Vitek was Greenholtz
v. Nebraska Penal Inmates. Greenholtz held that a

Nebraska statute limiting a prisoner's privilege of
parole to certain specified circumstances triggered
a protected liberty interest.85 However, the Court
limited the procedural protections mandated by
this interest to the objective expectations that the
prisoner obtained from the statute.86 Morrissey, in
contrast, held that a prisoner who suffers a grievous
loss of parole rights is entitled to procedural protections to the full extent necessary to protect him
from an arbitrary deprivation. The Greenholtz Court
refused to allow the Morrissey test, which had reasoned that regardless of the statute, the mere existence of the parole system generated an expectation
of due process. Instead, the Court in Greenholtz
stated that the government need provide inmates
only those protections prescribed by statute, even
if different factual situations might justify more
procedural 87
protections in the interest of fundamental fairness.
The Greenholtz decision rests on an important
distinction between being deprived of the liberty
one possesses, as in parole revocation, and being
denied freedom one desires, as in a parole release
8

2 Id., see Note, supra note 4, at 395.

83427 U.S. at 243.
8 Id.
85442 U.S. 1.
8
76Id. at 4-5.
8 Id. at 4.
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decision. However, this distinction calls the holding into question, because the infringement is the
same whether a prisoner is being released on parole
or involuntarily returned to prison. When the state
rejects the prisoner's request for parole, he must
continue to suffer the degradations of prison life. If
the parolee is returned to prison, he loses his freedom and good-time credits. Both deprivations are
similar. By narrowly basing an inmate's liberty
interests on a statutory entitlement, the Greenholtz
Court adopted the positivist theory of Meachum and
Montanye.
The Vitek Court, however, appears to have returned to the Court's earlier view in Haines and
Morrissey. Vitek held that a prisoner has a liberty
interest independent of positive law in the avoidance of being stigmatized as mentally ill and subject to involuntary psychiatric treatment. a9 Vitek
clarifies the theory that state law and specific constitutional guarantees are not the sole source of an
inmate's liberty interests. A protected liberty interest may be implied by the word "liberty" in the
due process clause.' Nebraska attempted to define
Jones' liberty interests as encompassing only those
rights granted by state law. Nebraska contended
that since section 83-180(1) specified that a prisoner
may be transferred if a designated physician or
psychologist found that he suffered from a mental
disease not treatable in prison, Jones had no objective expectation that he would not be transferred
until after a hearing. Since there was never any
claim that the statute was violated, Nebraska argued that Jones had no right to additional procedural protections because any right he had by
statute he received.9 '
Rigid application of Nebraska's reasoning would
read the due process clause out of the Constitution
as a restraint on state action in prisoners' rights
cases. The Court rejected this reasoning. If an
individual may be transferred to a mental hospital
without due process safeguards, nothing prevents
the state from transferring him to an institution
using electroshock therapy or to a home for the
retarded. The treatment that a prisoner may expect
in a prison, in other words, is radically different
from the treatment he may expect in a mental
hospital. Involuntary psychiatric treatment is not
within the scope of a prisoner's sentence nor within
88 Id

89 100 S. Ct. at 1263.

90Id. at 1264.
91See Brief for Appellee at 19-20, Vitek v. Jones, 100
S. Ct. 1254 (1980).

the individual prisoner's reasonable expectations of
what he will be forced to tolerate. However, according to the entitlement doctrine, an inmate has
no liberty interest in not being transferred to an
asylum, because the Nebraska statutes afforded
him no justifiable expectation that he will not be
transferred. When due process protections are
made to turn on state law, the state can completely
obviate the requirements of the fourteenth amendment by specifying which liberty interests will be
secured to the prisoner. Thus in no case can a due
process claim prevail against the wishes of the state
under the entitlement doctrine.
The Court recognized that limiting the rights of
a convicted prisoner to those that the state chooses
to give him is a niggardly approach to liberty in a
free society. The holding of Vitek recognized that
even though a prisoner gives up some liberty following a valid conviction, he does possess a residuum of constitutionally protected liberty. Justice
Stevens, in his dissent in Meachum, stated this concept which the Court adopted in Vitek:
[F]or if an inmate's liberty interests are no greater
than the state chooses to allow, he is really no more
than the slave described in the Nineteenth Century
cases. I think it is clear that even an inmate retains
an unalienable interest in liberty-at the very minimum the right to be treated with dignity-which
the Constitution may never ignore .... 92
Consequently, Vitek rests on a broad concept of
the word "liberty" in the fourteenth amendment.
The Court rejected the approach that defined all
protected inmate interests with reference to
whether the government, through statutes or administrative regulations, had created an expectation that a certain status will continue. 9 Instead,
Vitek makes clear that the liberty interests of prisoners may be implied by the language of the due
process clause, which secures those natural rights
that the framers intended to protect from arbitrary
governmental interference.
The policy considerations supporting the Court's
decision in Vitek demonstrate that the entitlement
theory of constitutional liberty espoused in Mea94
chum, Montanye, and Greenholtz is logically circular.
U.S. at 232.
100 S. Ct. at 1264.
' See generally, Note, Beyond the Ken of the Courts: A
CritiqueofJudicialRefusal to Review the Complaints of Convicts,
92427
9

72 YALE L.J. 506, 515 (1963). The author refers to the
circular argument that states that administrative decisions are not subject to judicial review because they are
administrative decisions and therefore not subject to
administrative review.
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Since due process protections depend upon the
existence of an entitlement under state law, the
states are allowed to determine the existence of a
liberty interest and the procedures to be followed
in determining the rights of prisoners without regard to the Constitution. If the existence of due
process safeguards hinges upon whether a prisoner
has an objective expectation of a benefit under
state law, then the judiciary is compelled to overlook the fact that ultimately the existence of all
liberty depends upon acquiescence of the state.
The entitlement doctrine contains no self-limiting
principle to prevent the state from conditioning the
existence of a liberty interest so that the interest
will be unprotected when the state determines that
the requisite conditions do not exist. Under the
entitlement doctrine, whether the method the state
employs to determine a prisoner's liberty interests
is consistent with the requirements of fundamental
fairness is irrelevant. Rather, the prisoner's liberty
interest will automatically fail when the state
makes the judgment that the reasons for forfeiture
exist, leaving the prisoner with no statutory entitlement to support his claim of a denial of due process
under the fourteenth amendment. Therefore, the
state may then deprive the prisoner of his liberty
interest without violating the guarantees of the due
process clause. This positivist concept is logically
circular because it allows the states to determine
the existence of these rights in the first instance
without regard to the Constitution.
If Nebraska's arguments had prevailed in Vitek,
the Court would have effectively retreated to the
discredited view that prisoners are slaves of the
state. 95 Nebraska argued that responsibility for
prison administration lies exclusively with the legislature, and that the legislature had properly assigned this responsibility to the Department of
Corrections.9 Control of the procedural protections
afforded to prisoners, however, should not reside in
the political branches of government. Judicial abdication of responsibility for protecting prisoners'
rights would negate the judicial commitment to

95The expression "slaves of the state" was first adopted

in Rullin v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21 Graft) 1024,
1026-27 (1871). The term implies that once a prisoner is
convicted and incarcerated, he is no longer a free man.
Therefore, he is outside the protection of the due process
clause, although it was apparently always recognized
that he retained the benefit of more specific constitutional
guarantees.
Brief for Appellee at 21, Vitek v. Jones, 100 S.
9See
Ct 1254
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achieve the purposes of sentencing. Several commentators have observed that the specific goals of
sentencing a prisoner will be frustrated if control
over penological practices lies exclusively within
the political branches. For instance, the judiciary
may want to emphasize rehabilitation and deterrence in sentencing. However, these goals will be
frustrated if state correctional authorities choose to
emphasize retribution. The judiciary will be impotent to exercise its rightful authority if penological practices are immune from review. Consequently, the entitlement doctrine allows the legislature and the executive to thwart the objectives of
the criminal justice system by virtually eliminating
the check of the judicial branch on their power.
Furthermore, the entitlement doctrine assumes
that the state intended to shield practices of the
98
correctional system from judicial review. The fact
that the state gives a prisoner a reasonable expectation that he will not be denied a benefit unless
specified statutory conditions exist does not compel
the conclusion that the state intended to limit a
prisoner's rights to statutory entitlements. The legislature could have concluded that statutory entitlements should be supplemental to constitutional
guarantees. Alternatively, the legislature may not
have considered the balance between statutory and
constitutional protections at all in constructing its
penological system. Therefore, the judiciary does
not necessarily contradict the intent of the legislature when it supplements statutory entitlements
with constitutional protections. Courts often are
forced to extend the scope of prisoners' rights by
rendering decisions which do not conflict with
penological practices, but which fill a void created
by the legislature and the executive.99 Indeed, the
role ofjudicial review in constitutional government
is in part to ensure that a state operates its correctional system in a manner countenanced by the
1 °
Constitution of the United States."
The entitlement doctrine, moreover, departs

97 See generally, Haas, Judicial Politics and Correctional
Reform: An Analysis of the Hands-Off Doctrine, 1977 DEiT.
C.L. REV. 795, 802; Robbins, The Cry of Wolfish in the
Federal Courts: The Future of FederalJudicial Intervention in
Prison Administration, 71 J. CRIM. L. & C. 211 (1980).
98 See Kimball & Newman,JudicialIntervention in Correctional Decisions: Threats and Reprisals, 14 CRIME & DELINQIJENCY 1, 8 (1968).
9 See Eisenberg & Yeazell, The Ordinaryand the Extraordinary in Institutional Litigation, 93 HARV. L. REV. 465, 496
(1980).
'00 Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362, 385 (E.D. Ark.
1970), affd, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971).
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from the recent trend under the due process clause
to require equity in all state action. The entitle.
ment doctrine, carried to its logical conclusion,
would allow the states to rewrite their statutes to
eliminate all possible liberty interests. Interpreted
in this manner, the entitlement doctrine not only
defeats its purpose as a source of individual rights,
but also has the potential to undermine many of
the procedural protections already afforded under
state law.' 0 ' For example, in Morrissey, Wolff, and
Gagnon the Court held that due process attached
where state law affirmatively granted a liberty
interest such as parole, good time, and probation.
In any of these cases, a state would be free to dilute
the procedural safeguards afforded by the Court
simply by rewriting its statute so that an inmate
would no longer have an objective expectation that
he would not be deprived of these privileges unless
he was given a hearing.
Meachum, Montanye, and Greenholtz relied upon the
theories of federalism in declining to extend additional procedural protections to inmates. The
Court stressed its institutional incapacity to review
prison management. However, this argument is
weak because the Supreme Court has shown proper
respect for states' rights in many other areas without abdicating the judicial function to protect
constitutional rights.' °2 The inevitable involvement
of the judiciary in criminal punishment means that
it cannot avoid the complicated issues that arise in
cases involving prison administration. As the parties' briefs in Vitek demonstrate, the judiciary can
rely upon parties with adverse interests to provide
a wealth of information for evaluating public policy. In Vitek, the briefs included substantial excerpts
from social science studies about prison administration as well as excerpts from the department of
corrections about internal department procedures.' 03 Therefore, the briefs virtually provided a
legislative history upon which judges could rely to
weigh the competing interests of individual prisoners and prison administration. Moreover, unlike
the legislature, the judiciary is immune from immediate political pressures. The Court is in a position to refuse to accept budgetary pressures as an
excuse for failure to comply with constitutional
requirements in determining prisoners' rights. Legislators who are facing reelection do not enjoy
101

See Note, supra note 4, at 397.

102See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
103 See

Brief for Appellant at 29-31, 34-37, Vitek v.
Jones, 100 S. Ct. 1254 (1980); Brief for Appellee at 2427, Vitek v. Jones, 100 S. Ct. 1254.

similar luxuries.i 0 4 Similarly, the Court is not a

bureaucracy, as is a department of corrections, and
need not work through a rigid line of authority to
enforce the requirements of fair process.' 0 5 Moreover, the Court is in a position to consider a broader
range of values than a department of corrections.
While concern about administrative efficiency and
convenience may predominate in the decisions of
the executive branch, the Court is able to consider

the broader implications of protecting human dignity in prison management. Therefore, the argument that courts should not enter into the province
of the legislature is inapposite in prisoners' rights
cases.

Finally, if the overriding objective of the entitlement doctrine is the protection of legitimate expectations of an individual in his dealings with government, the entitlement doctrine defeats this objective1t 6 The assertion that government creates
expectations only through the enactment of statutes is unrealistic. Most citizens are unlikely to be
aware of the details of positive law. Consequently,
the expectations that an individual has in certain
liberty interests depend upon his perceptions of the
values inherent in a free society. Rather than thinking in terms of statutory law, most individuals
perceive constitutional liberty as those natural
privileges recognized at common law as essential
07
to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.1
The Constitution, moreover, does not support the
positivist notion that the citizens shall enjoy those
rights that the government expressly grants them.
The framers intended that the people be guaran'04See, Eisenberg & Yeazell, supra note 99, at 506-07.
'05 See Note, supra note 4, at 403-04.
'06Id. at 397.
107 Obviously,

this standard is not subject to precise
formulation. However, the Supreme Court's substantive
due process analysis has furnished a broad definition of
liberty protected against arbitrary encroachments by procedural protections. Core liberty interests included in this
capacious definition were described by the Court in
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923): "[N]ot
merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right
of the individual to contract, to engage in the common
occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry,
establish a home and bring up children [and] to worship
God according to the dictates of... conscience." Surely,
the right to be free from involuntary commitment to a
mental hospital is of an equally fundamental nature.
Indeed, it appears to be encompassed in the Court's
statement that an individual is entitled to be free from
arbitrary physical restraints. Since physical restrictions
are greater in an asylum than in a prison, an inmate's
initial confinement is irrelevant in determining whether
he is entitled to the residual liberties that he possesses
under the Meyer test.
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teed natural rights of liberty, broadly conceived,
and that the government have only those powers
expressly granted by the Constitution.
Finding that the transfer of an inmate from
prison to a mental hospital did affect significant
liberty interests, the Vitek Court used the test set
l
out in Matthews v. Eldridgees to determine the re-

quirements of due process. The Matthews Court
stated that three factors determine the procedures
which satisfy due process. First, the Court must
weigh the private interest which will be affected by
the state action. Second, the Court must also consider the risk of an erroneous deprivation of the
private interest and the probable value of following
substitute procedural safeguards. Finally, the
Court must consider the administrative and fiscal
burdens which the alternative procedural safeguards would entail.' °9
The prisoner's right to avoid transfer to a mental
hospital is different from his interest in avoiding
an administrative transfer between prisons. In Mea°
chum v. Fano" and Montanye v. Haymes,"' the Court

held that an inmate's liberty interests are not infringed when he is transferred from one prison to
another without a hearing, unless there is some
justifiable expectation rooted in state law that he
will not be transferred except upon the occurrence
of specified events. However, when an inmate is
transferred from prison to a mental hospital, he
has a liberty interest which is affected because of
the adverse consequences of being officially labeled
insane. Furthermore, the transferred prisoner undergoes involuntary psychiatric treatment and
medication as well as greater physical restraints.
Therefore, an inmate transferred to an asylum is
not making a horizontal transfer between institutions which impose similar deprivations. Instead,
he is "twice cursed" because he will be forced to
of being a criminal and
endure both the indignities
2
a mental patient."

The case of Joseph Jones provided convincing
evidence that the difference in conditions of confinement between any of Nebraska's prisons and its
mental hospitals were substantial in that the latter
were additionally oppressive. Jones was involuntarily given medication which itself can damage
mental health. He was also subject to a behavior
modification program which restricted personal
liberties to a significantly greater extent than a
'08 424 U.S.
'0 424 U.S.
110427 U.S.
. 427 U.S.

319 (1976).
at 334-35.
215.
236.
112 United States cx rel. Schuster v. Herold, 410 F.2d

1071, 1073 (1969).
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maximum security institution. The mental hospital
deprived Jones of such elementary freedoms as the
choice of whether to take an afternoon nap, chew
gum or keep books and writing paper in his room.
Moreover, the rules of the asylum did not allow
patients to have normal contacts with the outside
world by watching television or listening to the
radio. Since involuntary medication and stringent
behavior modification programs are not part of
normal prison life, this set of facts provided an
incentive for the Court to distinguish transfers to
a mental hospital from the113internal prison transfers
of Meachum and Montanye.
Mental patients must endure added deprivations
and regimentation to which the average prisoner is
not exposed. Several decisions of the Court and
lower courts addressed this problem before Vitek
was decided. In Baxstrom v. Herold,"' the Court
reasoned that although transfer among like institutions is a purely administrative matter, assignment of prisoners among functionally distinct institutions may not be wholly arbitrary. The Court
concluded that a transfer between a mental hospital and a prison is not merely an administrative5
concern. In United States ex rel. Schuster v. Herold,"1

the court again held that a prisoner had a right to
a full hearing before he was transferred from a
state prison to a state mental hospital for the
criminally insane. In Matthews v. Hardy,11 the court
found a distinctive stigma associated with mental
illness which is different from that associated with
criminality and concluded that the impact of a
commitment on future job possibilities and personal friendships is devastating, regardless of the
length of the commitment. Finally, in Chesney v.
Adams," 7 the court noted that the need to ensure
the efficient administration of prisons and maintain prison order did not justify labelling the transfer of a prisoner from prison to a mental hospital
as administrative. The court reasoned that the
state's acceptance of the term "commitment" to
characterize such a transfer was a concession that
it was not merely an administrative concern.
Therefore, at the time Vitek was decided there
was substantial support in the Supreme Court and
lower courts for the proposition that the transfer of
an inmate to a mental hospital does infringe protected liberty interests, and is not merely a part of
normal prison administration. Because such a
113Brief for Appellee at 29-31, Vitek v. Jones, 100 S.
Ct. 1254.

383 U.S. 107 (1966).
u5 410 F.2d 1071 (2d Cir. 1969).
116 420 F.2d 607 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
117 377 F. Supp. 887 (D. Conn. 1974).
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transfer amounts to a grievous loss to the prisoner,
it should not be imposed without a full hearing. In
Vitek, the district court concluded that the greater
physical restraints at the Nebraska hospital, the
stigmatizing consequences of the transfer, and the
hospital's use of behavior modification techniques
combined to make this transfer a major change in
conditions of confinement. The court stated that
such a transfer is not within the range of deprivations to which
a conviction and sentence subjects
8
a prisoner."
Finding that a prisoner has a strong private
interest in avoiding an involuntary transfer to a
mental hospital, the Court concluded that the risk
of an erroneous deprivation of this interest is high
when the inmate is transferred without a hearing.
As the district court noted, the only procedural
safeguard attending such transfers is often the opinion of a single physician or psychologist appointed
by the department of corrections.1 9 Since the diagnostician is often an employee of the department,
his professional evaluation may be colored by his
desire to give his employer the diagnosis he desires.
Moreover, even if the psychiatrist is scrupulously
objective, psychiatric diagnoses are inherently uncertain. Therefore, a system which relies upon a
psychiatric evaluation by one person is likely to
produce a large number of mistakes. In addition,
the quality of psychiatric care an indigent inmate
is likely to receive is at best uneven because indigent inmates cannot pay well for psychiatric services. Another problem is that the transferee may
not be able to understand or challenge the professional conclusions of the physician. 120 Because the
patient and his physician are likely to come from
drastically different social and educational backgrounds, the physician will possess unreviewable
discretion if the prisoner is not granted a hearing
before transfer. The record of Vitek indicates that
an even higher risk of mistake is involved when
there is a delay in returning the prisoner to the
prison after he has been cured. In the case of an
intervenor in the Vitek case, for instance, the fourweek delay in returning the prisoner
was attribut21
able to bureaucratic inefficiency.
In determining the state's interest in transferring
a prisoner to a mental hospital without a hearing,
the Supreme Court approved the district court's
"aMiller v. Vitek, 437 F. Supp. 568, 573 (D. Neb.
1977).
no See Miller v. Vitek, 437 F. Supp. at 573.
'2o Id. at 575.
121Brief for Appellee at 23, Vitek v. Jones, 100 S. Ct.
1254.

conclusion that a mentally ill inmate can usually
be adequately maintained in the prison system
without a hearing. Most prisons possess physical
security, a staff of psychiatrists, and a prison hospital so the prisoner can be kept without hurting
himself or others.ls2 Unlike other hearings in which
the witnesses will be prison inmates exposed to peer
pressures, witnesses at a commitment hearing are
often civilians. Therefore, the danger of calling
witnesses is less when the question is whether the
inmate is mentally ill than when the issue is
whether he has disobeyed some rule and should be
punished. 123 Furthermore, supplementary procedures would not create an additional fiscal or
administrative burden. In most cases, those likely

to be transferred are so clearly in need of treatment
that the transfer would be uncontested. In those

cases where the transfer is disputed, the propriety
of commitment is more likely to be ambiguous.
Furthermore, the hearing probably would not force
the state to hire more personnel, which would
otherwise increase the financial burden. The state
could use its hearing officers, who were hired to
conduct parole and probation revocation proceedings, to serve as an independent decisionmaker in
the transfer hearing.'?' Therefore, the requirements
of notice, a formal hearing before an independent
decisionmaker, and a written statement of the evidence relied upon and the reasons for the decision
do not place an unacceptable burden on the state.
The requirement that an inmate who is involuntarily transferred to a mental hospital must be
afforded counsel in the hearing is a more controversial proposition. A mentally ill person needs
competent assistance because he may be unable to
understand the nature of the proceedings against
him.is 5 Additionally, an inmate suffering mental
illness is often regularly medicated before being
involuntarily transferred."6 Because a sedated person often behaves in a way indistinguishable from
someone who is mentally ill, there is no guarantee
that he will not be medicated at a hearing and

12 Miller
123Id.
12

v. Vitek, 437 F. Supp. at 574.

Brief for Appellee at 24, Vitek v. Jones, 100 S. Ct.

1254. See also Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. at 562-66.

The Court had required states to hire hearing officers to
serve as independent decisionmakers in hearings in which
good-time was at stake. Therefore, the cost of hiring an
independent decisionmaker in the case at hand would be
minimal.
12i Brief for Appellee at 39, Vitek v. Jones, 100 S. Ct.
1254.6
12 Id. See also Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. at 430.
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thus appear to be mentally ill even if he is not.1
Furthermore, psychiatrists have been known to
abuse medication, particularly when treating indigent and disruptive patients. A psychiatrist employed by the department of corrections may succumb to pressure by prison officials to medicate a
particularly troublesome prisoner who wanted to
contest his hearing. If prisoners are not permitted
legal representation to protect their interests, prison
officials could abuse medication of prisoners in
order to farm out those that they do not like.
Another problem is that an inmate without an
attorney might rely upon the mistaken diagnoses
of a single psychiatrist, without appreciating that
psychiatric diagnoses are largely subjective.lss For
these reasons, Justices White, Brennan, Marshall,
and Stevens joined in Vitek to conclude that an
inmate has a right to counsel at the transfer hearing.
Nevertheless, as Justice Powell noted, some characteristics of this type of hearing indicate that a
qualified and independent representative who is
not a lawyer could adequately represent the inmate
at the hearing. A mental health professional, for
instance, might be better able than an attorney to
detect the presence of medication or to recognize
the need of another professional opinion about
sanity. Because a transfer hearing involves analyzing psychiatric evaluations, with which lawyers are
unfamiliar, a mental health professional might
even be preferable to an attorney as an advocate.
Furthermore, the presence of lawyers might transform involuntary commitment proceedings into
adversary hearings, which are not conducive to
aiding the prisoner's positive and satisfactory adjustment to institutional life.'2 Requiring an attorney at the hearing would increase the costs to
the state, with the result that many prisoners in
need of psychiatric care may not be transferred if
the state deems the costs of the transfer to exceed
the benefits to the institution. Consequently, the
presence of counsel at involuntary transfer proceedings was wisely left to the discretion of the state by
the Vitek Court.
CONCLUSION

The holding in Vitek that prisoners have liberty
interests independent of positive law indicated that
'27 Brief for Appellee at 39, Vitek v. Jones, 100 S. Ct.
at 1254.
128
'2

id.
Miller v. Vitek, 437 F. Supp. at 575.
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the Court is ready to take an active role in protecting prisoners from arbitrary administrative action.
The Court rejected a passive, "hands-off" role for
the federal courts in prisoners' rights cases, portending a new era in which the federal judiciary
will actively shield the rights and dignity of prisoners. The Court recognized that an interpretation
of the due process clause to protect only those
rights which the legislature has expressly granted
is inconsistent with the purpose of a written constitution. Protecting the rights of prisoners, who
haye no access to the political process, is a legitimate judicial function. The purpose of the due
process clause is to protect individuals from arbitrary state action. For the state to determine the
existence of protected rights and appropriate protective procedures offends the theory underlying
the Constitution, that the people retain natural
rights of liberty.
In balancing the state's interest in summary
action against Jones' interest in avoiding transfer
to a mental institution, the Court determined that
Jones had a strong private interest in avoiding
commitment. The Court noted that the peculiar
conditions of prison life differentiate it from a
mental institution and rejected Nebraska's claim
that treatment of mental illness is functionally
indistinguishable from other medical treatment.
Moreover, the Court concluded that the uncertainties of psychiatric diagnoses of indigent inmates
produce frequent mistakes of judgment in involuntary commitment proceedings. Thus, the risk of
erroneous commitment outweighed the state's interest in avoiding the minimal cost and inconvenience of providing a formal hearing before a prisoner is transferred to an asylum. Finally, the Court
indicated that the specific procedures which must
be followed before a prisoner is committed are
flexible. Because the issue at a commitment hearing
is essentially medical, the Court reasoned that a
qualified and independent advisor who is not an
attorney is able to represent a prisoner at a commitment proceeding. Judicial appreciation of the
conditions of prison life and the realistic possibilities for improvement is a first step toward ensuring
that decisions affecting prisoners' rights are made
in a manner that comports with due process. Vitek
v. Jones, therefore, effectively removes the entitlement doctrine from the law of prisoners' rights in
its recognition that incarceration is only a restraint
on physical liberty.
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